Revolution: Immediate Security Issues

A rumor has circulated that confiscated phones have been bugged before the detained individuals are released. Assuming this is true:

• Do not use a phone once it has been confiscated unless to spread misinformation. Any call will identify someone that intelligence may want to detain.
• All communication should be done via external proxy. For example, twitter allows communication without direct contact between parties involved and securely if via HTTPS as does Facebook.
• Preferably all significant information, such as user names, phone numbers, email addresses, and tactical or strategic plans must be viewed via HTTPS so that it cannot be intercepted as it is sent to your computer or phone.

For more static communications outside of social networks one can set up a new account on Google. Mail and documents within Google are served using HTTPS. However, keep in mind that under interrogation anything stored in a user account may be revealed -- simply by giving away username and password details. It is important to realize that all details can be subject to discovery by regime security elements.

However, this does not reduce the effectiveness of sharing information. For example, this blog contains some strategic ideas but does not identify anyone. The only possibility is that the regime will end up looking for various target address in order to look for people who might be attempt to load it's pages. This blog, and others, can be a vital way to collect and distribute information anonymously.

I am at work and don't have time to provide a lot more information but it is vital that the revolution get serious about these types of things and work to foil the operation of the regime's security apparatus. Failing to do so may be fatal.

Sneaking in some additional thoughts while I have a moment. We need to make sure of several things:

• Not to collect everybody involved in organizing in one place at one time.
• Not to have everyone doing the same thing. For example, everyone is consumed by the Ghonim release issue... it only takes a group of organized people to alert media and push the issue. Others need to continue to focus on additional tasks. The regime must be laughing at the swarms of concern... knowing that they can simply detain individuals and progress stops.
• I don't know if you want to call them committees or not but we need to self organize. I am in communication with another person and am hoping we'll collaborate to develop strategic issues -- so, maybe we are an unofficial strategic issues committee.
• Useful committees may include a detainee release committee. This one may need people spread worldwide to keep pressure and media attention focused 24x7.
• I'd suggest we don't enumerate a list of committees. In fact, the less focused we are the harder it is to track us. People very involved know who many other people are. It's not that hard to connect and generate information without sharing contact information.
• Never forget, everything you read can be read by regime security assholes, never rely on secrecy but instead rely on anonymity and non-specific details. For example, anyone can act on items in this blog if they feel it wise, but nobody is identified in any capacity.

Let's disrupt the security apparatus of this mother fucking regime and kick some ass -- non-violently of course. Stay strong.

Finally, keep in mind, it is possible for the US government to ask Google, Twitter or Facebook to provide usage details. If that concerns you there are certainly other locations but they are likely to have the same issues.